Barry University School of Law

Digital Commons @ Barry Law
Faculty Scholarship

2012

Professor Kingsfield in Conflict: Rhetorical
Constructions of the U.S. Law Professor Persona(e)
Carlo A. Pedrioli
Barry University

Follow this and additional works at: https://lawpublications.barry.edu/facultyscholarship
Part of the Legal Education Commons, Legal History Commons, and the Legal Profession
Commons
Recommended Citation
Carlo A. Pedrioli, Professor Kingsfield in Conflict: Rhetorical Constructions of the U.S. Law Professor Persona(e), 38 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 701 (2012)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Barry Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by
an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Barry Law.

PROFESSOR KINGSFIELD IN CONFLICT:
RHETORICAL CONSTRUCTIONS
OF THE U.S. LAW PROFESSOR PERSONA(E)
CARLO A. PEDRIOLI*
I.

INTRODUCTION

At least since the 1960s, a “‘two cultures’ phenomenon” has become
quite apparent within the legal field in the United States.1 On one hand,
some lawyers, usually those within the university, have been more
academically oriented, and, on the other hand, other lawyers, usually those
in legal practice or sitting on the bench, have been more pragmatically
oriented. Problems arise when these two groups begin to talk differently
from each other.2 In a way, the field of law has developed into at least two
different legal professions,3 and, not surprisingly, scholars and practitioners
have experienced tension because of this situation.4 The problem comes to
a head when, through rhetoric,5 lawyers envision their ideal role(s) for the
law professor.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Barry University. B.A. (summa cum laude), Communication and
English, California State University, Stanislaus, 1999; J.D., University of the Pacific, 2002; M.A.,
Communication, University of Utah, 2003; Ph.D., Communication, University of Utah, 2005. The
author is a member of the State Bar of California. For insightful feedback on prior versions of this
Article, the author thanks David J. Vergobbi of the University of Utah, Lisa Flores of the University of
Colorado at Boulder, Wayne McCormack of the University of Utah, Tarla Rai Peterson of Texas A&M
University, and Richard D. Rieke of the University of Utah. The author dedicates this Article to Bobby
Lee Gabell, friend and fellow student of higher education.
1. Harry H. Wellington, Challenges to Legal Education: The “Two Cultures” Phenomenon, 37
J. LEGAL EDUC. 327, 327 (1987).
2. Id.
3. Robert Stevens, American Legal Scholarship: Structural Constraints and Intellectual Conceptualism, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 442, 445 (1983).
4. Francis A. Allen, The Prospects of University Law Training, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 127, 131
(1978). In recommending that law schools should offer students more practical experience during the
students’ study of law, the Carnegie Foundation has suggested that law schools are at least somewhat
disconnected from the world of legal practice. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ANNE COLBY, JUDITH WELCH
WEGNER, LLOYD BOND, & LEE S. SHULMAN, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE
PROFESSION OF LAW (SUMMARY) 8-10 (2007). See also David Segal, What They Don’t Teach Law
Students: Lawyering, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/business/afterlaw-school-associates-learn-to-be-lawyers.html?pagewanted=all.
5. In general, the term rhetoric refers to communication, which itself refers to human symbol
use. SONJA K. FOSS & KAREN A. FOSS, INVITING TRANSFORMATION: PRESENTATIONAL SPEAKING FOR A

701

702

OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

The law professor is the central figure in the education of prospective
lawyers, “the principal actor in the [law school] classroom.”6 In many
cases, the law professor can represent students’ first encounters with the
legal field and has the opportunity to make “a positive impact” on students.7
Naturally, the law professor can make a negative impact on students, too.
Either way, the law professor helps to shape the way students view the legal
field because, when interacting with students, “the law professor . . .
convey[s] a sense of what it means to be a lawyer.”8
Within the legal profession, the law professor has “a profound impact
on thinking about law, procedure, and institutions.”9 Today, because “[t]he
American law professor is American legal education,”10 he or she is “both
the gatekeeper[ ] and molder[ ] of the profession.”11 In 1927, Felix
Frankfurter, then a law professor at Harvard University and a future justice
on the U.S. Supreme Court, observed, “In the last analysis, the law is what
the lawyers are. And the law and the lawyers are what the law schools
make them.”12 Given such “a tremendous influence” that the law professor
has on the U.S. legal system,13 one might think of the law professor as a
senior high priest among the high priests.
In the mid-1980s, Douglas D. McFarland conducted research that
sought to understand the images of U.S. law professors, both those images
that law professors had of themselves and those images that practicing
lawyers and law students had of law professors. McFarland’s study
CHANGING WORLD 4 (2003). Various types of rhetoric are available to communicators. For example,
traditional rhetoric is based on persuasion. In his fourth century B.C. treatise On Rhetoric, Aristotle saw
rhetoric as “an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the available means of persuasion.” ARISTOTLE,
ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 36 (George A. Kennedy trans., 1991). Additionally,
invitational rhetoric is based on dialogue. Some feminist scholarship has suggested that rhetoric can be
“an invitation to understanding as a means to create a relationship rooted in equality, immanent value,
and self-determination.” Sonja K. Foss & Cindy L. Griffin, Beyond Persuasion: A Proposal for an
Invitational Rhetoric, 62 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 2, 5 (1995). Moreover, cooperative rhetoric is based on
problem-solving. Contemporary scholarship has theorized that rhetoric can be “a process of reasoned
interaction intended to help participants and audiences make the best assessments or the best decisions in
any given situation.” JOSINA M. MAKAU & DEBIAN L. MARTY, COOPERATIVE ARGUMENTATION: A
MODEL FOR DELIBERATIVE COMMUNITY 87 (2001) (emphasis omitted).
6. Robert J. Borthwick & Jordan R. Schau, Gatekeepers of the Profession: An Empirical Profile
of the Nation’s Law Professors, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 191, 195 (1991).
7. Jason Ostrom, The Competing Roles of Law Professors, 42 S. TEX L. REV. 539, 540 (2001).
8. Id.
9. ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE
1980S xiii (1983).
10. Douglas D. McFarland, Self-Images of Law Professors: Rethinking the Schism in Legal
Education, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 232, 232 (1985) [hereinafter McFarland, Rethinking the Schism].
11. Borthwick & Schau, supra note 6, at 193.
12. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34 (1992).
13. Eugene A. Gilmore, Some Criticisms of Legal Education, 7 A.B.A. J. 227, 230 (1921).
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concluded that, at least throughout the years studied, lawyers could not
agree whether the law professor should be more academic or practical in
nature.14 McFarland observed that legal academics and practitioners had
come to “live in different rhetorical worlds.”15 Specifically, these players in
the legal field came to develop “little or no understanding” of each other
and even became “hostile to one another.”16 Although each camp continued
to disseminate its rhetoric, the other camp failed to process that rhetoric
because the views of the camps were so different.17 Quite simply, the
communication was not working well.18 Since this communication had not
been moving forward, observers reasonably could expect nothing more than
minor change, if that at all.19
McFarland’s study addressed legal articles from the 1960s, 1970s, and
early 1980s, but, as a function of the time in which the study took place, the
research did not consider legal articles from the mid-1980s on.20 Although
he expressed doubt about studying the past of the conflict over the law
professor, McFarland explicitly suggested studying the law professor over
time as a topic for future research.21 Also, McFarland conceded that
essentially “[t]he discussion . . . should be read as descriptive rather than
normative.”22 In other words, McFarland’s study offered no major
suggestions for addressing the problem he identified. Given the time that
has passed since McFarland conducted his research, as well as the lack of a
normative dimension to that research, further study of the role(s) of the law
professor is appropriate and may lead to important new insights.
Calling upon rhetorical theory, this Article traces the contours of the
conflict over the construction of the role(s), or persona(e), of the U.S. law
professor from 1960 to the present. The Article draws an initial line at 1960
because, by the 1960s, law schools in the United States had matured to the
point at which they clearly were thinking of themselves as graduate
programs within the university system.23 After a discussion of persona
14. Douglas Dale McFarland Jr., Self-Images of Law Professors: Rethinking Legal Education
230-31 (1983) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota) (on file with Wilson Library,
University of Minnesota) [hereinafter McFarland, Rethinking Legal Education].
15. Douglas D. McFarland, Students and Practicing Lawyers Identify The Ideal Law Professor,
36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 93, 105 (1986) [hereinafter McFarland, Students and Practicing Lawyers].
16. Id.
17. McFarland, Rethinking the Schism, supra note 10, at 260.
18. McFarland, Students and Practicing Lawyers, supra note 15, at 106.
19. Id. at 106-07.
20. McFarland, Rethinking Legal Education, supra note 14, at 45.
21. Id. at 237.
22. Id. at 207.
23. Thomas F. Bergin, The Law Teacher: A Man Divided Against Himself, 54 VA. L. REV. 637,
649 (1968). Today, U.S. legal education offers its graduates an advanced degree, the J.D. Xu Wei, A
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theory and persona analysis, this Article will address the two major
personae that have emerged in the conflict, the law professor as scholar and
the law professor as practitioner. As appropriate, each subsection of the
Article that considers a persona also will address the type of rhetoric that
lawyers have employed in developing their preferred persona. In this study,
the term lawyers will refer to both practicing lawyers and academic lawyers.
A concluding section will synthesize some of the communication problems
that have emerged in this ongoing conflict, usually due to a heavy reliance
on traditional Aristotelian rhetoric, or persuasion,24 as a rhetorical strategy.
Although descriptive in nature, the current Article will set the stage for a
subsequent article, normative in nature, that will open the door to an
alternative approach to this ongoing conflict.
II. PERSONA THEORY AND PERSONA ANALYSIS
This section of the Article addresses the theory and methodology for the
study. More specifically, the section calls upon rhetorical theory for a
discussion of persona theory and persona analysis.
A. Persona Theory
Persona theory considers the roles, or personae, that communicators, or
rhetors, create in discourse.25 At least four types of personae can be present
in discourse, including the first, second, third, and fourth personae. This
subsection of the Article will reference each persona, but, given the focus of
the Article on the first persona, this subsection will concentrate on the first
persona as opposed to the other personae.
One can describe the first persona as “the constructed speaker/writer or
‘I’ of discourse.”26 Such a persona is “‘the created personality put forth in
the act of communicating’”27 and allows the rhetor to identify with the
audience.28 In literature, the first persona is the speaker or character a writer

Comparative Study of Environmental Law Clinics in the United States and China, 19 EDUC. & L.J. 75,
78 (2009).
24. See supra, note 5.
25. Paaige K. Turner & Patricia Ryden, How George Bush Silenced Anita Hill: A Derridian View
of the Third Persona in Public Argument, 37 ARGUMENTATION & ADVOC. 86, 88 (2000).
26. Id.
27. Paul Newell Campbell, The Personae of Scientific Discourse, 61 Q. J. SPEECH 391, 394
(1975) (emphasis omitted) (quoting WALKER GIBSON, PERSONA: A STYLE STUDY FOR READERS AND
WRITERS xi (1969)).
28. Walter G. Kirkpatrick, Bolingbroke and the Opposition to Sir Robert Walpole: The Role of a
Fictitious Persona in Creating an Audience, 32 CENT. STATES SPEECH. J. 12, 12 (1981).
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creates in the course of crafting writing like poetry or fiction.29 In a way, a
first persona is a rhetorical mask that the rhetor chooses to wear as he or she
performs rhetorically, and because the persona at issue is a mask, the
persona is not necessarily the rhetor himself or herself.30
Several examples of first personae that rhetors have adopted will help
illustrate these principles. For instance, in 1916, Marcus Garvey, the thenunknown leader of the new Universal Negro Improvement Association,
faced the problem of leading members of an outsider racial group against
social injustice.31 In part, Garvey met the challenge by assuming a Black
Moses persona.32 In his rhetoric, Garvey relied upon subjects like election,
captivity, and liberation, calling to mind Moses and the Jewish experiences
from the Old Testament.33 While Garvey was not actually Moses, he did
assume the Moses persona. A more recent rhetor who adopted the Moses
persona, among other personae, was Louis Farrakhan. In his Million Man
March speech, delivered on October 16, 1995, in Washington, D.C.,
Farrakhan attempted to enhance his credibility, or ethos, which had suffered
due to Farrakhan’s prior inflammatory rhetoric, by assuming a prophetic
persona, specifically that of Moses.34 In a related example, Martin Luther
King, Jr., assumed in his rhetoric against civil rights violations the general
persona of a prophet, although despite his skillful rhetoric King was not
necessarily an actual prophet.35
Regardless of which first persona or personae a rhetor assumes, the
notion of the first persona comes from Greek and Roman theater and in
Latin suggests the idea of a “mask” or a “false face.”36 In this theatrical
context, the actor would put on a mask and assume the persona of the
mask.37 Such a historical understanding gives rise to the notion that the
persona is pre-existing and that the actor only needs to assume the role.38
Much of the existing scholarship on persona theory takes for granted that an

29. Emory B. Elliott, Persona and Parody in Donne’s The Anniversaries, 58 Q. J. SPEECH 48, 49
(1972); Campbell, supra note 27, at 391.
30. Thomas O. Sloan, The Persona As Rhetor: An Interpretation of Donne’s Satyre III, 51 Q. J.
SPEECH. 14, 14, 26 (1965).
31. B. L. Ware & Wil A. Linkugel, The Rhetorical Persona: Marcus Garvey As Black Moses, 49
COMM. MONOGRAPHS 50, 52-53 (1982).
32. Id. at 61.
33. Id. at 56-61.
34. John L. Pauley, Reshaping Public Persona and the Prophetic Ethos: Louis Farrakhan at the
Million Man March, 62 W. J. COMM. 512, 512-14, 522-23 (1998).
35. Campbell, supra note 27, at 394.
36. Ware & Linkugel, supra note 31, at 50.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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advocate assumes a role from a selection of cultural archetypes, or original
models or prototypes.39
Despite what much previous scholarship suggests, not all personae need
to be pre-existing. For example, one might argue that Franklin Roosevelt
and Winston Churchill created their own personae during the dark days of
the Great Depression and World War II. Rather than selecting from
previously existing personae they might adopt, the two leaders created their
own distinct personae.40 Later leaders could call upon the Roosevelt and
Churchill personae for rhetorical effectiveness. Thus, it is important to note
that some rhetors are able to create their own personae, which then can
become part of a repository of available personae from which other rhetors
can select.
While in certain cases the two concepts of construction and
performance of first personae can function together, distinguishing between
two major types of first personae is necessary, as this Article will for its
analysis. On one hand, a rhetor can select and assume a persona in his or
her communication. The focus of study here is on the performance, so it is
appropriate to think of this type of first persona as first persona performed
(FPP). On the other hand, as in the case of the construction of the role of
the then-new U.S. president, the rhetor involved might create the persona,
which the rhetor himself or herself or a different rhetor might employ in
subsequent discourse. The idea is the creation of a rhetorical tool for later
implementation. This additional type of first persona is a first persona
constructed (FPC). The theoretical distinction allows critics to focus more
on either performance or construction of first personae.
In addition to helping explain the personae advocates can adopt for
themselves, persona theory also addresses the roles, as the rhetor constitutes
them, that audiences play in the communication process.41 These roles that
audiences play are the second, third, and fourth persona; respectively, the
personae are idealized, marginalized, and collusive in nature. They are
mentioned here for theoretical context only. The second persona is the
“implied auditor” who is supposed to respond to the rhetor’s appeals.42 If
the first persona is the “I” of discourse, the second persona is the “‘you’
of . . . discourse.”43 While the first persona is the assumed “I” and the
second persona is the assumed “you,” the third persona is “the ‘it’ that is not
39. Id.
40. Id. at 62.
41. Turner & Ryden, supra note 25, at 88-89; Charles E. Morris III, Pink Herring & The Fourth
Persona: J. Edgar Hoover’s Sex Crime Panic, 88 Q. J. SPEECH 228, 230 (2002).
42. Edwin Black, The Second Persona, 56 Q. J. SPEECH 109, 112 (1970).
43. Turner & Ryden, supra note 25, at 89.
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present, that is objectified in a way ‘you’ and ‘I’ are not.”44 This persona
captures the experience of negation.45 Like the second persona, the fourth
persona functions as an implied auditor of a given ideological position, but a
key distinction between these two personae is that the discourse that creates
the fourth persona operates at two levels, the level of those in the know and
the level of those who do not understand the double entendre.46
As this subsection of the Article has noted, a rhetor can constitute
various personae in his or her discourse. A rhetor can select or create a first
persona, which the rhetor then assumes. A rhetor even may construct a
persona for later use, as has been the case when lawyers have constructed
the persona(e) of the law professor in the United States. Also, through
discourse the rhetor can constitute at least three distinct audience-based
personae, including the second, third, and fourth personae.
B. Persona Analysis
Although not all communication scholars have employed persona
theory from a rhetorical perspective,47 this Article calls upon persona theory
from such a perspective, specifically to analyze lawyers’ writings on the
ideal role(s) of the law professor. Rhetorical scholars have offered some
discussion of the methodology of persona theory, which several such
scholars have labeled persona analysis.48
At least two types of persona analysis are possible. One type of
analysis is first persona performed (FPP), which considers roles that rhetors
perform in discourse, while the other type of analysis is first persona
constructed (FPC), which considers the rhetorical creation of roles that
rhetors might perform in the future. Although FPP has been the traditional
approach taken in rhetorical studies, FPC, which this Article seeks to
develop, is more appropriate for this study because the present study
focuses on creation, not performance, of roles. Here, the interest is in the
expectations that lawyers have had for the ideal role(s) of the law professor.
Nonetheless, contrasting FPP analysis with FPC analysis will afford a better
understanding of FPC analysis, so this subsection of the Article initially will

44. Philip Wander, The Third Persona: An Ideological Turn in Rhetorical Theory, 35 CENT.
STATES SPEECH J. 197, 209 (1984).
45. Id. at 210.
46. Morris, supra note 41, at 230.
47. See Kenneth L. Hacker, Walter R. Zakahi, Maury J. Giles, & Shaun McQuitty, Components
of Candidate Images: Statistical Analysis of the Issue-Persona Dichotomy in the Presidential Campaign
of 1996, 67 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 227, 232-35 (2000).
48. Craig R. Smith, The Persona of Jesus in the Gospel According to St. Matthew, 14 J. COMM.
& RELIGION 57, 64 (1991); Turner & Ryden, supra note 25, at 90.
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review how one might conduct an FPP analysis before the subsection
reviews how one might conduct an FPC analysis.
With regard to FPP analysis, B. L. Ware and Wil Linkugel argued that
the critic who performs the persona analysis should identify a rhetor who
“represents or symbolizes an historic period, a movement, or world-view.”49
In other words, the rhetor studied should be significant in one way or
another. Examples would be politicians, social activists, and lawyers. After
identifying the rhetor, the critic consults relevant artifacts that become the
objects for study.50 Relevant artifacts are the rhetorical texts, such as
speeches, diary entries, and performances, that a rhetor has constructed.
After selecting the artifacts, the critic can consult a variety of sources,
including “the aesthetic realm of literature or myth, or . . . an analogous
historical episode,” for authority on the persona the rhetor in question
arguably adopts.51 Often, the adopted persona is a cultural archetype, which
is an original model or prototype upon which later models are based.52
These sources offer the critic a selection of possibilities for potential
personae, which the critic uses as evidence that the rhetor employed a
particular persona in the text. For instance, in their study of Black activist
Marcus Garvey, Ware and Linkugel consulted the biblical authority Exodus
for an understanding of the Moses prophet persona, which they then argued
Garvey had assumed.53 If the critic is concerned with the response of the
specific audience in question, the critic may need to determine whether the
audience would ascribe to the rhetor the qualities of the given persona.54
This inquiry could be whether a Black audience of the early twentieth
century would be likely to link a social activist with a prophet persona like
Moses.
Regardless of whether the critic is concerned with the audience’s
ascribing to the rhetor the particulars of a persona, the critic still needs to
explain how the rhetor calls upon the persona, which gets at the rhetorical
strategy at hand.55 In their study of Garvey, Ware and Linkugel made
numerous comparisons between Garvey’s circumstances and rhetoric and
the circumstances and rhetoric of Moses in Exodus, including calls to
leadership, signs of leadership like drawing large audiences,
characterizations of people as divinely chosen, and experiences of liberation
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Ware & Linkugel, supra note 31, at 62.
Turner & Ryden, supra note 25, at 90.
Ware & Linkugel, supra note 31, at 62.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 62.
Id.

2012]

PROFESSOR KINGSFIELD IN CONFLICT

709

from captivity.56 Ideally, the critic will complete the analysis with an
explanation of how the assumed persona could impact the rhetorical
situation.57 For example, Ware and Linkugel noted that Garvey‘s rhetoric
was a factor that helped him assume a position of leadership in the
movement for Black equality in the United States during the early twentieth
century.58 This was historically important because the death of Booker T.
Washington in 1915 had left a void in leadership in the Black community.59
With regard to FPC analysis, which is the tool in the present study, a
slightly different approach is appropriate. In this study, conducting such an
analysis involves consideration of law review articles and other legal
writings about lawyers’ expectations of the ideal law professor role(s)
produced since 1960. More details on the sample follow shortly.
Such consideration involves identification of the various traits for which
lawyers have argued in their writings on the ideal law professor persona(e)
and organization of such traits into various categories of personae. For
instance, such traits include participating in full-time teaching and research
or having extensive practical experience in lawyering. These may be more
scholarly or more pragmatic in nature. When considered together, the
particular characteristics within artifacts offer an outline of a law professor
persona that certain rhetors have put forth. Unlike an FPP analysis, an FPC
analysis may not give the critic the opportunity to rely upon various
precedents for the persona because the persona is often new. The
methodology employed here is similar to content analysis, except that the
process is based on rhetorical studies rather than social science.
Unfortunately, research for this Article did not locate any examples of
FPC studies. As noted above, critics have focused their energies on
studying the FPP. Nonetheless, rhetorical personae have to come from
somewhere, so at some point in time their construction must have taken
place. Accordingly, FPC studies are appropriate, and this Article offers
such a study.
The sample for this study comes from a search of the electronic
database HeinOnline. HeinOnline contains law review articles that date
back to the nineteenth century. For example, the database contains the first
issue of the American Law Register, which debuted in 1852 and later
became the University of Pennsylvania Law Review. Although HeinOnline
56. Ware & Linkugel, supra note 31, at 55, 58, & 59-61.
57. For more on the rhetorical situation, see Lloyd F. Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, 1 PHIL. &
RHETORIC 1 (1968). For a critique of Bitzer’s argument, see Richard E. Vatz, The Myth of the Rhetorical Situation, 6 PHIL. & RHETORIC 154 (1973).
58. Ware & Linkugel, supra note 31, at 52-53.
59. Id. at 53.
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does not necessarily contain all law reviews, the database does contain
hundreds of law reviews, including law reviews at some of the most
influential law schools. A key advantage of the database is that, unlike
databases such as Westlaw and LexisNexis, HeinOnline contains articles
that date back to the 1960s, the early part of the period covered in the
current study. Hence, because it goes back so far, HeinOnline proved to be
an appropriate database for this particular study.
The search in HeinOnline identified any law review article since 1960
that contained the terms law and professor in the title. Many such articles,
although not all, would be likely to address the subject of this Article, but
these articles would not necessarily provide a comprehensive listing of
relevant articles since the conflict may have appeared in articles that did not
focus exclusively on the law professor. To increase the number of
appropriate articles identified, the search included locating relevant articles
cited in the footnotes of the articles that resulted from the HeinOnline
search. Accordingly, while the texts located for this study are by no means
all those relevant to the topic, they are both broad in their historical origins
and not necessarily limited to articles that focused exclusively on the law
professor.
Another point relevant to the sample of the articles considered for this
study is that a review of the articles suggested that the search successfully
located various key positions in the conflict over the rhetorical construction
of the law professor persona(e). When an attorney is attempting to
determine where the law stands on a particular matter, the attorney conducts
research until the same main points of law continue to recur within the body
of research. Then the attorney can be reasonably confident that he or she
has located the appropriate law on a given matter. In the same way, this
search turned up several recurring perspectives in the discourse on the law
professor persona(e), including the law professor as scholar and the law
professor as practitioner. These perspectives have played out in the conflict,
but at this point it is important to note that the recurrence of such
perspectives suggests that the search successfully focused in on a common
nucleus of operative views in the conflict, even if different advocates may
have presented the views in slightly different ways.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE TEXTS
Applying persona theory to the texts located for the study, this section
of the Article examines the various personae that lawyers have created in
their rhetorics. Such a discussion focuses on the law professor as scholar
persona and the law professor as practitioner persona.
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A. The Law Professor As Scholar
The law professor as scholar model has been an important model of the
law professor persona since 1960, if not well before. The rhetoric of
lawyers who have supported this model has offered dimensions of the
scholar persona that include a full-time dedication to the job, teaching
duties, production of research, and a public function.
In constructing this persona, lawyers generally have called upon
traditional rhetoric, or persuasion,60 because the lawyers have been making
and supporting claims to advance their position. In adopting traditional
rhetoric, the lawyers have advanced four main claims: (1) the law professor
persona should involve devoting almost all professional time to the
university, (2) the law professor persona should include a teaching
dimension, (3) the law professor persona should have a research dimension,
and (4) the law professor persona should include a public function
dimension. To develop these major claims that have outlined the scholar
persona, lawyers have offered various types of evidence. The following
discussion examines the arguments that have fleshed out this persona.
Advocates of the law professor as scholar model have maintained that
full-time dedication to the job should be an important dimension of the law
professor persona. Various aspects of this dimension come from the fact
that the law professor is a member of the university after perhaps only a
short tenure in legal practice, if that at all. As Robert A. Leflar noted,
following two to five years of private practice or government experience,
the law professor devotes himself or herself to full-time work in the
academy, although some outside work may take place on the side, provided
that work does not “interfere with [the law professor’s] day-to-day
performance” of working in the university.61 Robert L. Bard of the
University of Connecticut suggested that the law professor has the status
that comes with ready access to various individuals such as secretaries and
research assistants.62 Often, access to these people is an indication of fulltime employment within an organization. Meanwhile, Robert M. Jarvis of
Nova University noted that the law professor has a good amount of
available time, and much of that time is open for conducting research.63
This available time is designed to keep the law professor away from “the
60. See supra, note 5.
61. Robert A. Leflar, The Law Teacher’s Place in the American Legal Profession, 8 J. SOC’Y
PUB. TCHRS. L. 21, 23 (1964).
62. Robert L. Bard, Legal Scholarship and the Professional Responsibility of Law Professors, 16
CONN. L. REV. 731, 736 (1984).
63. Robert M. Jarvis, Why Law Professors Should Not Be Hessian-Trainers, 13 NOVA L. REV.
69, 76 (1988).
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greater financial rewards offered by private practice.”64 Bard concurred
with that point.65 By making the point, Jarvis was suggesting largely
separate spheres for lawyers in the academy and for those in the world of
practice. In short, because the law school is situated in the university,66 the
law professor tends to be a regular member of the university faculty and
does not hold other major positions.
In addition to full-time devotion to the job, advocates of the law
professor as scholar model have argued that teaching duties should remain
an important aspect of the law professor=s persona. Various examples help
to demonstrate this point. For instance, lawyers have discussed the
purposes and methods of law teaching. Anthony D’Amato of Northwestern
University argued that teaching law should be about teaching law students
to cope with legal problems.67 Unlike traditional undergraduate lectures
that tend to do nothing to change a student’s “mental pathways,” the process
of “[t]eaching [law] is an attempt to change the student’s mind.”68 In this
sense, the law professor has a duty to try to do more than teach the
memorization of legal rules; instead he or she needs to enhance the
student’s thinking skills because not endeavoring to do so would indirectly
harm “the poor future client who discovers too late that her lawyer is part of
her problem and not part of her solution.”69 As such, law professors often
employ the Socratic method of questioning students regarding the materials
for classes.70 D’Amato argued that the questions a professor asks while
employing the Socratic method should not suggest specific answers;
instead, the questions should encourage students to develop new ways of
thinking.71
Lawyers have made other points about law teaching. Jarvis maintained
that the law professor should instruct students in the area of legal policy,72
while Roger C. Cramton of Cornell University noted that, because the law
professor spends most of his or her time teaching large classes of students,
teaching is a key part of the law professor persona.73 Due to law school

64. Id. at 70-71.
65. Bard, supra note 62, at 736.
66. John H. Crabb, On Integrating Law with the Academic World, 14 J. LEGAL EDUC. 329, 329
(1962).
67. Anthony D’Amato, The Decline and Fall of Law Teaching in the Age of Student Consumerism, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 461, 493 (1987).
68. Id. at 462.
69. Id. at 494.
70. Id. at 466.
71. Id.
72. Jarvis, supra note 63, at 77.
73. Roger C. Cramton, Demystifying Legal Scholarship, 75 GEO. L.J. 1, 8 (1986).
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economics, such large courses may include 100 to 150 students each.74
Regardless, law professors are still supposed to make the classroom
experience valuable for students.
More specifically, lawyers have staked out ground on issues relevant to
the new law professor. One such lawyer was Susan J. Becker of Cleveland
State University, who noted that two of these issues include deciding which
law courses to teach and learning how to teach.75 Becker explained that the
specifics of law teaching consist of items such as self-presentation in front
of students, choosing course materials, preparation of a syllabus, handling
the first day of class, and interacting with students.76 In terms of interacting
with students, Becker reflected in the following manner:
In my brief career, I have faced students who repeatedly arrived ten
minutes late for class (usually with steaming cup of coffee in hand);
talked audibly while I or a fellow student had the floor; raised their
hands in a Pavlovian response every time a question or comment
danced into their heads; continued to wave the raised hand like a
first-grader in need of a bathroom pass until I called on them;
yawned as if they had never been so bored in their entire lives;
asked questions that had been asked and answered at least twice in
the previous five minutes; coughed so loudly during class that I
could not speak over the noise; fell asleep (sitting straight up, no
less); exhibited the dreaded “So what are you going to do about it?”
sneer while informing me that they weren’t prepared to discuss the
assigned material; and even passed a case brief to a student I had
called on who obviously hadn’t read the assignment.77
In response to such behaviors, Becker advocated responses like commenting
on the offending behavior.78 Thus, in reply to the yawning student, the
professor might comment, “‘I’m sorry if we’re boring you; I’ll try to move
on to something more exciting as soon as possible.’”79 In part because
lawyers like Becker have reflected on their teaching in this manner,
teaching has remained an important dimension of the law professor as
scholar persona.

74. George C. Christie, The Recruitment of Law Faculty, 1987 DUKE L.J. 306, 315 (1987).
75. Susan J. Becker, Advice for the New Law Professor: A View from the Trenches, 42 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 432, 433-34 (1992).
76. Id. at 434-42.
77. Id. at 440.
78. Id. at 440-41.
79. Id. at 441.
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Not only have lawyers embraced the importance of the law professor’s
relatively traditional teaching duties, but some lawyers have advanced
alternative ways to teach, including those ways which outsider philosophies
have informed. For instance, in critiquing the domineering Kingsfield
model from the 1970s film The Paper Chase,80 Catharine W. Hantzis of the
University of Southern California offered a feminist perspective on law
teaching, suggesting that such teaching would benefit from the professor’s
spending time with students, showing students that the professor cares, and
finding new experiences for the professor’s students.81 Respectively, these
suggestions might manifest themselves in a law professor’s having lunch
with a colleague in the student cafeteria so that the professor is available for
informal student interaction, breaking large classes into small groups on
certain days, and perhaps even requiring students in a class on disability law
to maneuver around the campus in wheelchairs for a few hours.82 One goal
of such an approach to teaching is for the professor to be “both practical and
student centered.”83
While full-time dedication to the job and teaching have continued to
function as notable dimensions of the law professor as scholar model,
advocates of this persona have argued that research should be a major focus
of the persona. Attention given to multiple aspects of scholarship, including
its justifications, illustrates this point. For example, Anthony Chase of
Nova University argued that law professors have had to produce legal
scholarship because at one time the legal profession chose “to utilize
universities to control the supply of lawyers in the United States.”84 In
essence, scholarship produces the dues that law professors owe the
universities in exchange for the universities’ granting “the socially and
economically useful premises and auspices of the American university” to
the legal field.85 As members and beneficiaries of the university system,
law professors have had to play by the rules of publishing or perishing.
Chase added that, at least during the late 1980s, law professors made more
money than professors in other academic fields, so law professors had
another reason for having to pay the publishing dues.86
Jarvis extended the idea that Chase and others have advocated,
specifically maintaining that scholarship should be “the single most
80. THE PAPER CHASE (Twentieth Century-Fox 1973).
81. Catharine W. Hantzis, Kingsfield and Kennedy: Reappraising the Male Models of Law
School Teaching, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 155, 156-57, 162-63 (1988).
82. Id. at 162-63.
83. Id. at 162.
84. Anthony Chase, The Legal Scholar As Producer, 13 NOVA L. REV. 57, 65 (1988).
85. Id. at 67.
86. Id. at 66.
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important item on [law professors’] professional agendas.”87 “[O]nly law
professors have the possibility of becoming and remaining authentic
academics,” Jarvis asserted.88 For instance, unlike practicing lawyers, law
professors have flexible professional time, resources for academic research,
and research assistants.89 Jarvis made the point that research should be law
professors’ top priority not only “the year before they come up for tenure”
but rather throughout their scholarly careers.90 If a lawyer in practice seeks
to make the transition to the academy, that individual most likely will need
to publish at least one article to make the case for his or her suitability for
functioning within the academy.91
In part because many lawyers have designated research as a major
dimension of the law professor persona, these lawyers have argued over the
particulars of legal scholarship. For instance, Cramton considered some of
the assumptions behind the production of traditional legal scholarship.
Cramton argued for a “modernist view of tentative and evolving truth” in
scholarship,92 as well as for backing away from advocacy writing.93
Additionally, Cramton bemoaned the point that the prolific scholar would
gain prestige and move up the ladder of law school hierarchy, regardless of
the quality of the scholarship he or she produced.94 Here, Cramton was
arguing against a quantity-over-quality approach to advancement in the
legal academy.
Meanwhile, during the 1980s, Richard Posner of the University of
Chicago addressed the various types of scholarship, including doctrinal
scholarship and interdisciplinary scholarship.95 According to Posner,
doctrinal scholarship is the traditional mode of legal scholarship,
supposedly free of other disciplines, by which law professors consider legal
authorities and refine an understanding of what legal doctrine is now and
should be in the future.96 On the other hand, interdisciplinary scholarship
considers law in light of other scholarly fields such as those in the
87. Jarvis, supra note 63, at 72.
88. Id. at 74.
89. Id. at 75-76.
90. Id. at 76.
91. Tanya K. Hernández, Placing the Cart Before the Horse: Publishing Scholarship Before
Entering the Legal Academy, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 517, 517 (2002); Rebecca E. Zietlow, Writing
Scholarship While You Practice Law, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 511, 511 (2002).
92. Cramton, supra note 73, at 5.
93. Id. at 7-8.
94. Id. at 14.
95. Richard A. Posner, The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1113, 1113,
1119 (1981).
96. Id. at 1113-14.
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humanities and social sciences.97 Posner concluded that, although doctrinal
scholarship “should remain the core of legal scholarship,” both types of
scholarship could have a home within the research dimension of the law
professor persona and that law schools should attempt to further that end.98
During the subsequent decade, Edward L. Rubin of the University of
California, Berkeley, concurred with much of Posner’s earlier critique of
interdisciplinary legal scholarship. Indeed, Rubin noted the overlap of law
and other areas of knowledge such as natural science, literary criticism,
moral philosophy, and social science.99 Although he accepted the potential
value of interdisciplinary scholarship in some cases, Rubin still drew lines
between legal scholarship and scholarship in other fields. For instance, he
argued that while legal scholarship was prescriptive, natural and social
science scholarship was descriptive, literary criticism was interpretive, and
moral philosophy was categorically prescriptive.100 According to Rubin,
differing assumptions about methodology proved too much for legal
scholarship to rely upon the approaches of other fields in most cases.101
Regardless of whether one accepts Rubin’s distinctions among the
approaches of the non-legal fields that he considered, Rubin’s focus on
scholarship, much like Posner’s focus, did help advance the notion of the
importance of the scholarly dimension of the law professor persona because,
one way or another, the law professor would create scholarship.
Beyond the considerations of Cramton, Posner, and Rubin, other
lawyers have argued the specifics of how new law professors should engage
in legal scholarship, thus again maintaining the belief that the law professor
persona has a key research dimension. Robert Abrams of Wayne State
University offered a few tips, including the need for writing regularly and
avoiding “[b]usy work” like “[b]ar journal articles, survey pieces, glorified
op-ed pieces appearing in non-law reviews, law alumni magazine articles,
previews of U.S. Supreme Court cases, nonsubstantive book reviews,
segments of commission reports or studies, etc.”102 Abrams urged the new
law professor to focus on “[h]igher orders” like “[a]ffirmative thesis
articles, law reform articles, book chapters . . . , frontal attacks on the citadel
of major legal doctrine, reconciliation of theory with practice articles, [and]

97. Id. at 1119.
98. Id. at 1113, 1129-30.
99. Edward L. Rubin, Law And and the Methodology of Law, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 521, 524-41
(1997).
100. Id. at 565.
101. Id.
102. Robert H. Abrams, Sing Muse: Legal Scholarship for New Law Teachers, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC.
1, 2 (1987).

2012]

PROFESSOR KINGSFIELD IN CONFLICT

717

longer works such as monographs and books.”103 Sherri L. Burr of the
University of New Mexico suggested the importance of a scholarly agenda
of interests and choosing to write from that set of interests.104 She
maintained that “what gives you the most satisfaction” should guide
selection from the set of interests.105
Abrams also advanced several points about self-motivation for writing
and the tenure politics that can follow writing. Addressing self-motivation
and paraphrasing a colleague, Abrams noted that “the first step in writing is
to take off your shoes. Then you crawl under your desk with a hammer and
nails and nail the shoes to the floor. Finally, you sit down at the desk, insert
your feet into the shoes, and tie your shoes on again.”106 In terms of tenure
politics, Abrams offered “a series of three propositions”:
1. Productive writers receive tenure.
2. Non-writers are denied tenure.
3. In cases not governed by the two primary rules the most
important determinant in tenure decisions is the quantity of
credible writing produced by the candidate.107
The sum total of the analysis was the following: “Write early and often!”108
Other lawyers have reviewed critically some of the purposes of legal
scholarship. For example, Robert Stevens of Haverford College questioned
the audience of legal scholarship. Stevens queried whether the law
professor would write academic work that professors in other fields might
read or pragmatic work that lawyers in the world of practice might use. 109
Stevens cautioned that law professors could not be all things to all people.110
Additionally, Marc Rohr of Nova University suggested that some law
schools might place too much emphasis on scholarship at the cost of law
students’ educational experiences because not all scholarship benefits
students.111 Nonetheless, by placing great emphasis on the research
dimension of the law professor persona, lawyers further have emphasized
their rhetorical construction of the law professor persona as that of a
scholar.
103. Id. at 2.
104. Sherri L. Burr, Reflections on a Scholarly Agenda for the Beginning Law Professor, 10 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 155, 155-58 (1991).
105. Id. at 159.
106. Abrams, supra note 102, at 8 n.13.
107. Id. at 11.
108. Id. at 13.
109. Stevens, supra note 3, at 446.
110. Id. at 445.
111. Marc Rohr, A Law School for the Consumer, 13 NOVA L. REV. 101, 102-04 (1988).
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As vital as research has continued to remain as a dimension of the law
professor as scholar model, advocates of this model have argued that the
public function dimension is also important, although its importance is not
as great as that of the research dimension.112 This public function
dimension has several strands, one of which is the development of
scholarship that is helpful to the world of legal practice.113 While such
scholarship may have “a good dose of theory,” this scholarship should give
“due weight to doctrine” so as to be of utility to legal practitioners.114
Roger J. Traynor, an associate justice on the California Supreme Court,
noted that judges and members of the practicing bar call upon law review
writing in judicial opinions and briefs to the court.115 Naturally, law
professors are frequently the authors behind law review articles. As such,
law professors should offer lawyers in the world of practice views on “how
the legal regime works” so that lawyers can employ such views while
working on cases.116
Other strands of the public function dimension of the law professor
persona likewise involve “devot[ing] a substantial component of [one’s]
work life to selfless public service.”117 Such additional strands include
improving social conditions for individuals who are unable to help
themselves118 and offering consultation to government entities.119 For
example, a law professor who teaches torts might offer services to a
legislative committee that is drafting a major new statute in the area of
products liability law. This type of service not only would help legislators
who would learn from the professor’s expertise and thus be able to produce
a more effective statute, but the service also could assist consumers who
may be unaware of the current limitations of state products liability law.
Besides providing such benefits, participating in this service would set a
positive example for law students who are on the verge of entering the
profession.120 In a post-Watergate world where the ethos of the legal
profession has been an ongoing matter of concern, providing such an
example would be an important benefit.121 Finally, the law professor might
112. Bard, supra note 62, at 733.
113. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 38 (1992).
114. Id. at 45-46.
115. Roger J. Traynor, To the Right Honorable Law Reviews, 10 UCLA L. REV. 3, 6 (1962).
116. Edwards, supra note 113, at 56.
117. Bard, supra note 62, at 749.
118. Id.
119. Stevens, supra note 3, at 446.
120. Bard, supra note 62, at 749.
121. Id.
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even take on the occasional high-profile case at the appellate level,
particularly if the case goes to the U.S. Supreme Court.122
While lawyers rhetorically have constructed a generally uniform scholar
persona of the law professor, some tension periodically can manifest itself
among the various dimensions of this persona. During the 1960s, Thomas
F. Bergin of the University of Virginia offered an explanation of the tension
between teaching future lawyers and engaging in scholarship. Although the
law professor may teach a favorite jurisprudential seminar, the professor is
also supposed to teach law students something about the world of practice, a
process which Bergin called “Hessian-training.”123 Unlike jurisprudential
teaching, such hands-on teaching often conflicts with the type of research
that the law professor does.124 From this perspective, the tension may be
impossible to cure.125 Clark Byse, formerly of Harvard University and then
visiting at Boston University, posited that because a law professor’s
research can inform his or her teaching and vice versa, hands-on teaching
and research should not be in great tension.126 Thus, a law professor ought
to be able to teach law students something about lawyering and also engage
in research on the law. Whether Bergin or Byse made the better point has
remained an unresolved issue.
As this Article has illustrated so far, advocates of the law professor as
scholar persona have argued that the law professor persona should include
the dimensions of a full-time dedication to the job, teaching duties,
production of research, and a public function. Indeed, the scholar persona
of the law professor has not been oriented heavily in the direction of legal
practice.
In presenting their ideal law professor persona as the scholar, lawyers
who have embraced this position have done so primarily through traditional
rhetoric. This rhetoric has involved the advancing and supporting of claims.
The texts studied here did not suggest any serious consideration on the part
of the pro-scholar rhetors of competing positions for the purpose of
understanding those positions. Indeed, the rhetoric essentially ignored the
pro-practitioner rhetoric that will receive attention in the next subsection of
this Article.
122. Jonathan L. Entin, The Law Professor As Advocate, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 512, 522-23
(1988).
123. Bergin, supra note 23, at 638.
124. Id.
125. John L. Costello, Jr., Another Visit to the Man Divided: A Justification for the Law Teacher’s
Schizophrenia, 27 J. LEGAL EDUC. 390, 391 (1975).
126. Clark Byse, Legal Scholarship, Legal Realism and the Law Teacher’s Intellectual Schizophrenia, 13 NOVA L. REV. 9, 29-31 (1988).
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B. The Law Professor As Practitioner
Although the above rhetoric strongly indicates support for the scholar
persona of the law professor, not all lawyers have accepted this type of
persona. Instead, some lawyers have argued vigorously for the merits of a
practitioner persona, which is experience-based.
In seeking to construct this alternative persona, lawyers have called
upon traditional rhetoric because these lawyers have been making and
supporting claims to advance their position. Through traditional rhetoric,
the lawyers have offered two major claims: (1) legal education, via the
scholar model, has failed to educate future lawyers adequately and (2) the
practitioner model would be a more effective approach to legal education.
To support these major claims, pro-practitioner lawyers have offered
various types of evidence. This discussion examines the arguments that
have advanced this practitioner persona.
Pro-practitioner lawyers have argued passionately that legal education,
through the scholar model, has failed to train prospective lawyers
adequately to practice law. This critique has come from as high up as the
U.S. Supreme Court. In the mid-1970s, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger
took U.S. legal education to task for not satisfactorily training law students
to function as competent courtroom lawyers.127
Calling upon
“conversations extending over the past twelve to fifteen years at judicial
meetings and seminars, with literally hundreds of judges and experienced
lawyers,” Burger estimated that perhaps “from one-third to one-half of the
lawyers who appear in the serious [legal] cases are not really qualified to
render fully adequate representation” to clients.128 Burger listed witness
examination and handling of evidence as examples of skills that many
lawyers had not mastered.129 Analogizing law with other fields, Burger
pointed out that “[t]he medical profession does not try to teach surgery
simply with books; more than 80 percent of all medical teaching is done by
practicing physicians and surgeons.”130
Burger was not the only individual upset with preparation for legal
practice. For instance, Patricia M. Wald, a judge on the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, took issue with the research
performance of the law professor who adopted the scholar persona and how
that performance did little to prepare students for practical legal writing.
127. Warren E. Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certification
of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 227, 227, 232 (1973).
128. Id. at 234.
129. Id. at 234-35.
130. Id. at 232.
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For instance, Wald noted that “[a]ble advocacy writing has little in common
with a long, discursive paper on some abstract facet of the law.”131 Wald
pointed out that this latter type of writing commonly has a home in “law
review ‘think’ pieces,”132 which, as noted above, have become a component
of one of the key dimensions of the scholar persona of the law professor.
Wald went so far as to explain that her “experience teaches . . . that too few
law review articles prove helpful in appellate decision making. They tend
to be too talky, too unselective in separating the relevant from the irrelevant,
too exhaustive, too exhausting, too hedged, too cautious about reaching a
definite conclusion.”133 From Wald’s perspective, the teaching of law
review writing by professors who have adopted the scholar persona has not
been in the interest of preparing law students to write as practicing lawyers.
Away from the bench, Scott Turow, a practicing lawyer in Chicago,
continued the critique of the efficacy of legal education, claiming, “To put it
plainly, law school is not lawyer school.”134 Turow argued, “The best
teachers of legal skills are those who use them, and it would have been
pointless for my Harvard Law School professors to attempt to instruct me
about the execution of tasks they themselves may barely know how to
perform.”135 Indeed, “law school [did] not teach students to think like
lawyers”; it instead taught students “to think like law professors.”136
According to Turow, something important was clearly missing from law
school.
In light of critiques of law school such as those above and others,
lawyers have argued that the practitioner model would be a more effective
approach to legal education than the scholar model. To address the
unsatisfactory status quo, Burger maintained that, at least in the case of trial
practice, “trial advocacy must be learned from trial advocates.”137 U.S.
legal education could learn from the hands-on approach that England has
employed in the training of its legal advocates,138 and the practitioner
persona would work well with such an approach. Ideally, this type of
approach would help address the level of incompetence that Burger and
others have described.
131. Patricia M. Wald, Teaching the Trade: An Appellate Judge’s View of Practice-Oriented
Legal Education, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 35, 42 (1986).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Scott Turow, Law School v. Reality, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1988, http://www.nytimes.com/
1988/09/18/magazine/law-school-v-reality.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Burger, supra note 127, at 232.
138. Id. at 228-30.
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From her perspective, Wald offered several benefits that law students
would gain from the law professor who effectively had assumed the
practitioner persona to teach. For instance, Wald stressed that law school
graduates should understand how claims progress through the system so that
graduates would know whether to litigate a particular claim; not all claims
can be litigated at acceptable costs, financial or otherwise.139 Also, in
noting the importance of trial experience, Wald quoted her former mentor,
Judge Jerome Frank, for the point “that focusing on [teaching] appellate
opinions, to the detriment of [teaching] what happened in the trial court,
was ‘like the difference between kissing a girl and reading a treatise on
osculation.’”140 Further, practical experience can allow law graduates to
understand the human dimensions of legal practice.141 As Wald noted, too
much technical training at the expense of learning how to deal “with real
clients, witnesses and even judges and court personnel” is detrimental to
legal practice because lawyers need to know how to interact with other
human actors in the legal world.142 Wald’s argument suggests that the
appropriate professor to help law students down this path would be the
professor who could assume the practitioner persona successfully.
Other individuals on the bench have concurred with the rhetoric of
Burger and Wald. Judge Sherman G. Finesilver of the U.S. District Court
of Colorado argued for the benefits of learning law from professors who
have adopted the practitioner persona. Finesilver declared that students
become more involved in learning from experienced practitioners because
such practitioners can offer realistic experiences that relate directly to “the
role of a functioning attorney.”143 Such practical experience should enhance
the relevance of law school for many law students and better help
prospective lawyers understand “both the immediate analytic aspects as well
as the larger social context of each case.”144
Support for the practitioner persona and its accompanying level of
expertise has come at the state level as well as at the federal level. Judge
Judith Ann Lanzinger, writing while on the Ohio Court of Common Pleas,
considered the benefits of the law professor’s adopting the persona of a
practitioner with judicial experience. Lanzinger argued that, by adding
“depth and breadth to the law school curriculum,” judges could “enrich the
139. Wald, supra note 131, at 36.
140. Id. at 43.
141. Id. at 38.
142. Id.
143. Sherman G. Finesilver, The Tension Between Practical and Theoretical Legal Education: A
Judge’s View of the Gap, 1977 BYU L. REV. 1061, 1062 (1977).
144. Id. at 1062, 1071.
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law school itself by balancing faculty who have limited practical
experience.”145 In particular, such judges might teach trial advocacy classes
and other litigation-related courses.146 If law schools without faculty
members with judicial experience were to consider employing judges parttime, the law professor persona would take a turn for the practical, which
would benefit students.147
Although lawyers in the world of practice have been the dominant
voices in the call for the practitioner model of the law professor and the
purported benefits to law students and the legal field that would come with
such a model, lawyers in the academy have not always avoided such
rhetoric. One example was Hugh W. Silverman of the University of
Windsor, who offered some suggestions that made their way into the U.S.
conflict over the rhetorical construction of the law professor. Silverman
contended that practical experience would allow a law professor to teach
effectively the overlapping nature of branches of law like contracts and torts
that frequently come together in practice, much more so than in law school
classes usually divided up artificially by areas of the law.148 Silverman
explained that “[t]he practitioner who has whetted his teeth upon the various
skills and arts of the law has a storehouse of knowledge and insight into the
nature and practice of the law, and can readily assess the needs of the
lawyer who is about to enter that arena.”149
Silverman suggested several ways in which the practitioner could bring
realistic experience to class. For instance, rather than relying upon
hypothetical situations to provide instruction, in teaching contracts, the
practitioner could instruct students in drafting contracts, in teaching torts,
the practitioner could offer examples from torts trials, and, in teaching civil
and criminal procedure, the practitioner likewise could present examples
from experience.150 Additionally, because the practitioner with trial
experience could offer law students a perspective apart from that via which
students merely would consider appellate law, this alternative approach
would broaden the education of law students.151
One special situation in which lawyers have argued that the practitioner
persona of the law professor can be especially helpful in establishing
145. Judith Ann Lanzinger, Judges Teaching in Law School: Who, What, Where, and Why Not? 43
J. LEGAL EDUC. 96, 107, 103 (1993).
146. Id. at 99.
147. Id. at 105.
148. Hugh W. Silverman, The Practitioner As a Law Teacher, 23 J. LEGAL EDUC. 424, 430
(1971).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 430, 431.
151. Id. at 431.
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professorial ethos and thus more effective legal education is clinical legal
education, which goes back at least as far as the 1960s.152 Clinical legal
education involves “integrating the law school with the judicial, legislative
and administrative processes of a community.”153 Often, the law school
runs the equivalent of a public interest law firm in which students work on
real-life legal problems under the supervision of experienced attorneys.154
According to supporters of clinical legal education, the benefits for
students are many. For example, Steven H. Leleiko of New York
University explained that clinical legal education provides direct legal
experience for law students, offers a different perspective on the law from
that found in traditional law school classes, opens up students’ minds to
social change, enhances students’ capacities, allows students to assume
responsibility in their chosen profession sooner, helps with “a broad range
of public service activities and the administration of civil and criminal
justice,” and challenges law students to employ multiple “intellectual
capacities” simultaneously.155 Naturally, clinical legal education can be
only as good as the quality of the supervision and the nature of the
opportunities that law students receive during their clinical experiences.156
For such experiences to have a chance to take place, the professor has to
assume the persona of a practitioner because the persona of a scholar would
not fit with the specific means of legal instruction. This is an example of a
case in which persona and ethos have a relationship,157 as the assumed
persona of the practitioner would help the professor develop ethos with the
audience of law students. If the audience is pragmatically oriented and the
performance is skillful, the audience’s perception of ethos most likely will
be positive. In turn, windows to learning will be more likely to open. Thus,
the likely consequences of the professor’s assumed persona include a strong
professorial ethos and an audience more open to instruction.
In an attempt to promote at least something of his favored model, Judge
Edward D. Re, formerly of the U.S. Court of International Trade and then of
St. John’s University, offered a dose of the practitioner model to
contemporary legal education. Reminding law schools that the basic goal of
legal education should be “to prepare law students for the legal profession,”
Re argued that the law professor without hands-on legal experience should
152. Steven H. Leleiko, Legal Education―Some Crucial Frontiers, 23 J. LEGAL EDUC. 502, 515
(1971).
153. Id. at 512.
154. Id. at 513.
155. Id. at 511-12.
156. Id. at 517.
157. Roger D. Cherry, Ethos Versus Persona: Self-Representation in Written Discourse, 15
WRITTEN COMM. 384, 402 (1998).
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take a sabbatical to “learn about the daily practice of law, and the practical
aspects of the trial and appeal of cases.”158 Such a sabbatical should last at
least a semester but preferably a full school year, and the sabbatical should
be the professor’s full-time occupation. The inexperienced law professor
would acquire hands-on experience and be able to pass on that experience to
law students and colleagues.159 While not fully able to assume the
practitioner persona, the law professor who assumed the scholar persona
nonetheless would be able to nod more credibly to the practical part of the
legal field.
As the arguments of these lawyers, including the lawyers on the bench,
show, discontent with the scholar persona of the law professor remains.
Giving a hearty nod to the practical qualities that they desire in legal
education, lawyers have advanced a spirited case for the practitioner
persona to have at least some space within the law school. Unfortunately
for these particular lawyers, the rhetoric of individuals like Re concedes that
the practitioner persona will not be the dominant model within the legal
academy in the near future. Still, lawyers have continued to argue for the
importance of the practitioner model, and the rhetoric of this persona has
remained defiant.
In seeking to develop their ideal law professor persona, lawyers who
have adopted a pro-practitioner position have employed traditional rhetoric.
This rhetoric has consisted of advancing and supporting claims. Although
Re conceded the prominence of the scholar model in contemporary legal
education, the texts studied here did not suggest serious consideration of the
pro-scholar position for the purpose of understanding.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has illustrated how the conflict between lawyers who have
supported the scholar model of the first persona of the law professor and
lawyers who have supported the practitioner model of the first persona of
the law professor has continued since 1960. The fact that many
compromise perspectives did not emerge from the rhetorical texts located
indicates that the lines of conflict have been sharp.
The traditional rhetoric that lawyers generally have employed in the
period since 1960 has not helped the tension in the field. Largely without
listening to the competing view in the conflict, lawyers in academia have
proceeded to advance their own position. Perhaps to some observers this
158. Edward D. Re, Law Office Sabbaticals for Law Professors, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 95, 95, 97
(1995).
159. Id. at 97-98.
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approach might appear appropriate because, by virtue of their location
within the university, these lawyers are currently in the position of power
regarding decision-making that surrounds the law professor persona(e) and
may be able to afford communicating in this unilateral manner. On the
other hand, lawyers in the world of practice have critiqued the view of
lawyers in the academy while advancing a very different view of the law
professor persona. In this ongoing exercise of either making a case to
members of one’s own group or making a case to members of one’s own
group and critiquing the other group’s position, even when that other group
is not listening, each party has failed to address the other party’s underlying
concerns.
One minor refinement to this general observation about traditional
rhetoric in the conflict is noteworthy because, in the sample of texts studied,
not quite every line consisted of purely traditional rhetoric. For example, in
her discussion of how to address various teaching issues in law school,
Susan J. Becker offered some personal examples from her own
classroom,160 a strategy more common to non-traditional rhetoric.161 On an
optimistic note, this point leaves open the door for other types of
communication to enter the conflict, but this rhetorical strategy was not the
norm.
In his mid-1980s research, McFarland noted that legal academics and
practitioners had come to “live in different rhetorical worlds.”162 These
lawyers had developed “little or no understanding” of each other and had
become “hostile to one another.”163 While each camp continued to create
and send out its rhetoric, the other camp did not process that rhetoric
because the perspectives of the camps were so divergent.164 Consequently,
no one could expect anything more than minor change in the
communication climate.165
Based on the current study, one now can make essentially the same
assessment about legal discourse on the U.S. law professor persona(e) from
1960 to the present time. In light of the longer study for which McFarland
called, which the current Article has provided, not only is the
communication problem as serious as McFarland argued, but the problem
has persisted in the decades since McFarland conducted his research. In
160. Becker, supra note 75, at 440.
161. Karen A. Foss & Sonja K. Foss, Personal Experience as Evidence in Feminist Scholarship,
58 W. J. COMM. 39, 39 (1994). See also Foss & Griffin, supra note 5, at 5-6 & 16.
162. McFarland, Students and Practicing Lawyers, supra note 15, at 105.
163. Id.
164. McFarland, Rethinking the Schism, supra note 10, at 260.
165. McFarland, Students and Practicing Lawyers, supra note 15, at 106-07.
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short, lawyers have talked past each other and clashed with each other,
making few concessions.
While McFarland did not offer any major suggestions for improving
this less than constructive communication,166 Francis A. Allen has
acknowledged that “[d]ialogue concerning the methods and emphasis of law
training . . . is indispensable to the continuing adaptation of legal education
to the world in which it finds itself.”167 Indeed, this statement hints at part
of the underlying problem with the communication in the current conflict.
Although the camps are disseminating their rhetoric, they often are not
attempting to listen deeply enough to understand each other, and, if they do
listen at all, the purpose is to be able to offer a rebuttal. Either way,
understanding of underlying concerns like intellectualism and practicality is
missing. The traditional approach to the rhetorical process, persuasion, has
not proved as helpful as one would have liked, but fortunately other
approaches to rhetoric are available to participants involved in the conflict
over the rhetorical construction of the law professor persona(e) in the
United States. Subsequent research will suggest another approach,
grounded in contemporary rhetorical theory, that goes beyond rhetoric
based almost exclusively on persuasion. At stake are the law professor
persona(e) and the impact of such persona(e) on legal education and the
practice of law in, and potentially beyond, the United States.

166. McFarland, Rethinking Legal Education, supra note 14, at 207.
167. Allen, supra note 4, at 131.

